Read e-book online Game Theory Topics: Incomplete Information, Repeated Games PDF

By Evelyn C. Fink

ISBN-10: 0585212139

ISBN-13: 9780585212135

ISBN-10: 0761910166

ISBN-13: 9780761910169

Video game concept, relatively using repeated video games, N-person video games, and incomplete details video games were renowned examine thoughts in political technological know-how, sociology and administration, yet tricky for brand new social researchers to exploit until eventually now.

This e-book goals makes those issues available to all social scientists. utilizing a standard social technological know-how online game, fowl, to demonstrate the innovations, the ebook introduces readers to: video games of incomplete info; the right way to construct uncertainty into online game theoretic versions; the idea that of Bayesian Nash equilibrium; and the position of repetition.

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Additional info for Game Theory Topics: Incomplete Information, Repeated Games and N-Player Games (Quantitative Applications in the Social Sciences)

Example text

Player 2: If Player 1 chooses contribute, then choose contribute. If Player 1 chooses not contribute, then choose contribute. Is this another pooling equilibrium? To answer this question, we compare this strategy to our earlier pooling equilibrium. The only difference in this strategy is that Player 2 chooses contribute when Player 1 chooses contribute. html (2 of 2) [4/16/2007 10:43:00 AM] Document Page 23 difference does not have any actual affect on the actions of the players. However, it is not a perfect Bayesian equilibrium since Player 2 is not behaving rationally off the equilibrium path.

Of course, several strategies could yield these actions. This first equilibrium results from Player 1, GM, always choosing to not contribute and Player 2, Ford, always choosing to contribute. Neither player can unilaterally make itself better off in any stage game. Player 1 would receive a payoff of 4 + 4 + 4 = 12 and Player 2 would receive a payoff of 1 + 1 + 1 = 3. There are other strategy profiles and thus strategies that are in equilibrium too. Player 1 and Player 2 could alternately contribute first.

We first need to consider what we mean by a repeated game. A repeated game is a series of constituent or stage games. In the case of GM and Ford hypothesized previously, the game could consist of a series of nightly meetings, which would create a repeated game of Chicken. Any particular night would be a stage in the game. Payoffs are awarded at the end of each stage game, n = 1, 2, 3, … , and summed for a total payoff for the repeated game. A strategy would be the series of choices for each stage, as if each player chose in advance what to do on a night by night basis.

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Game Theory Topics: Incomplete Information, Repeated Games and N-Player Games (Quantitative Applications in the Social Sciences) by Evelyn C. Fink


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